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Chapter 8
How Persistent Low Expected Returns Alter
Optimal Life Cycle Saving, Investment,
and Retirement Behavior
Vanya Horneff, Raimond Maurer, and Olivia S. Mitchell
Low interest rates are now a reality not only in the United States but around
the world, as recently noted by former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke (2015). In the US, the government can borrow for a decade at a
yield of only 2.3 percent, while in Switzerland, government bond yields are
negative out to 50 years (Lewin 2016; Zeng 2017). Our chapter explores how
this environment of persistent low returns is likely to inﬂuence saving,
investing, and retirement behaviors, compared to what in the past were
deemed more ‘normal’ ﬁnancial conditions.
The persistence of low returns has implications for many aspects of the
ﬁnancial market. In the case of deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pensions, a perman-
ently low interest rate can render the DB plan underfunded, particularly
when actual returns prove to be below those assumed when discounting
future payouts. In the case of deﬁned contribution (DC) plans, which are
now the norm in the United States, the implications are more complex.
In particular, persistent low returns can compel workers to save more and
invest differently when allocating across stocks and bonds. Moreover, the
low interest rate environment can also change retirement decisions, espe-
cially regarding how long to work and when to claim social security beneﬁts.
This chapter builds on a number of studies using a life cycle framework to
model and evaluate how individuals respond to a range of environmental
shocks. The workhorse model of Cocco et al. (2005) and Gomes and
Michaelides (2005) was extended by Love (2010) and Hubener et al.
(2016), who showed how family shocks due to changes in marital status
and children alter optimal consumption, insurance, asset allocation, and
retirement patterns. In Horneff et al. (2015), we demonstrated how capital
market surprises can inﬂuence saving and portfolio allocation patterns, and
in Chai et al. (2011) we showed how ﬂexible work patterns can help people
hedge both earnings and capital market risk. In the present chapter, we
evaluate how people might optimally respond to a persistently low return
environment by adjusting their consumption, saving, investment, and retire-
ment patterns compared to what used to be perceived as the ‘normal’
environment. Our chapter therefore builds on and extends the recent life
cycle model developed by Horneff et al. (2016). In contrast to that study, we
do not include annuity purchases but we do allow ﬂexible work effort and
endogenous claiming of social security beneﬁts.1
In what follows, we develop and calibrate a life cycle model that embeds
stock market and labor market uncertainty, as well as stochastic mortality.
We also incorporate US tax rules and minimum distribution requirements
for 401(k) plans, as well as real-world social security beneﬁt formulas. We
then show that our calibrated life cycle dynamic model produces realistic
results that agree with observed saving, work, and claiming age patterns of
US households. In particular, our model generates a large peak at the
earliest beneﬁt claiming age at 62, as in the data. Also in line with the
evidence, our baseline results show a smaller second peak at the (system-
deﬁned) Full Retirement Age (FRA) of 66. In the context of a zero-return
environment, we show that workers devote more of their savings to non-
retirement accounts and less to 401(k) accounts since the relative appeal of
investing into taxable versus tax-qualiﬁed retirement accounts is higher in a
low return setting. Finally, we show that people claim social security beneﬁts
later in a low interest rate environment. A short discussion concludes.
The Consumer’s Life Cycle Problem: Model
and Calibration
In this section we build and calibrate a dynamic consumption and portfolio
choice model for a utility-maximizing individual over the life cycle.
Preferences. We work in discrete time and assume that the individual’s
decision period starts at t ¼ 1 (age of 25) and ends at T ¼ 76 (age 100);
accordingly, each period corresponds to one year. The household has an
uncertain lifetime whereby the probability to survive from t until the next
year t þ 1 is denoted by pt . Preferences in each period is represented by a
Cobb Douglas function utðCt ; ltÞ ¼ ðCt l
α
t Þ1ρ
1ρ based on current consumption Ct
and leisure time lt normalized as a fraction of total available time. The
parameter α measures leisure preferences, ρ denotes relative risk aversion
and β is the time preferences factor. The recursive deﬁnition of the value
function is given by:
Jt ¼ ðCt l
α
t Þ1ρ
1 ρ þ βEtðpt Jtþ1Þ; ð1Þ
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with terminal utility JT ¼ ðCT l
α
T Þ1ρ
1ρ and lt ¼ 1 after retirement. Following
prior research in Horneff et al. (2016), the baseline calibration sets ρ ¼ 5
and β ¼ 0:96 for both males and females. The survival rates entering the
value function are taken from the US Population Life Table (Arias 2010).
We calibrate the leisure parameter α in such a way that our results match
empirical claiming rates reported by the US Social Security Administration.
This matching procedure produces leisure preference parameters of α ¼ 0:9
for males and α ¼ 1:1 for females.
Time budget, labor income, and social security retirement beneﬁts. Our
model allows for ﬂexible work effort and retirement ages. The worker has
the opportunity to allocate up to ð1 ltÞ = 0.6 of his available time budget
(assuming 100 waking hours per week and 52 weeks per year) to paid work.
Depending on his work effort, the uncertain yearly pre-tax labor income is
given by:
Ytþ1 ¼ ð1 ltÞ  wt  Ptþ1  Utþ1 ð2Þ
Here wt is a deterministic wage rate component, which depends on age,
education, sex, and if the individual works overtime, full time, or part time.
The variable Ptþ1 ¼ Pt  Ntþ1 is the permanent component of wage rates with
independent lognormal distributed shocks Nt  LN ð0:5σ2P ; σ2P Þ with a
mean of one and volatility of σ2P . In addition Ut  LN ð0:5σ2U ; σ2U Þ is a
transitory shock with volatility σ2U and uncorrelated with Nt:
The wage rate calibration builds on Horneff et al. (2016), who estimated
the deterministic component of the wage rate process wit and the variances
of the permanent and transitory wage shocks N it and U
i
t using the
1975–2013 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.2 These are esti-
mated separately by sex and by educational level, where the latter groupings
are less than High School, High School graduates, and at least some college
(<HS; HS; Coll+).3
Between ages 62 and 70, the worker can retire from work and claim social
security beneﬁts, the latter of which depend on his average lifetime 35 best
years of earnings. If the individual claims beneﬁts before (after) the system-
deﬁned Normal Retirement Age of 66, then his lifelong social security
beneﬁts will be reduced (increased) according to pre-speciﬁed factors. If
the individual works beyond age 62, we require that he devote at least a
minimum effort of at least one hour per week; also, overtime work is
excluded (i.e., 0:01  ð1 ltÞ  0:4).
Wealth dynamics during the work life. During working life, the individual
has the opportunity to use current cash on hand for consumption and
investments. Some portion At of the worker’s pre-tax salary Yt (up to a limit
of $18,000 per year) can be invested into a tax-qualiﬁed 401(k)-retirement
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plan of the EET type.4 That is, contributions into the account and investment
earnings on account assets are tax-exempt, (E), while withdrawals are taxed
(T). In addition, a worker can invest outside his retirement plan in risky stocks
St and riskless bonds Bt . As such, his cash on hand Xt in each year is given by
Xt ¼ Ct þ St þ Bt þ At ð3Þ
where the usual constraints Ct ;At ; St ;Bt  0 apply. One year later, his cash
on hand is given by the value of stocks (bonds) having earned an uncertain
(riskless) gross return of Rtþ1 (Rf ), plus income from work (after housing
expenses ht), plus withdrawals ðWtÞ from the 401(k) plan,minus any federal/
state/city taxes and social security Taxtþ1 contributions:
Xtþ1 ¼ StRtþ1 þ BtRf þ Ytþ1ð1 htÞ þWt  Taxtþ1 ð4Þ
We model housing costs ht as in Love (2010). Our ‘baseline’ ﬁnancial
market parameterizations assume a risk-free interest rate of 1 percent, and
an equity risk premium of 4 percent with a return volatility of 18 percent. In
simulations below of the low-yield environment, we vary these assumptions.
During his working life, the individual pays taxes ðTaxtþ1), which reduce
his cash on hand available for consumption and investments.5 These include
the labor income tax at a rate of 11.65 percent (the sum of 1.45 percent
Medicare, 4 percent city and state tax and 6.2 percent social security tax).
Under the US progressive tax system, the individual must pay taxes on labor
income as well as on withdrawals from tax-qualiﬁed retirement plans
(including a 10 percent penalty tax for withdrawals before age 60), and on
returns on stocks and bonds held outside the tax-qualiﬁed retirement
account. If his cash on hand falls below Xtþ1  5; 950 p.a. (an amount also
exempt from income taxes), he is supported by the state, so he has a
minimum wealth level of 5; 950 for the next year.
Prior to the endogenous retirement age t ¼ K , the assets in his tax-
qualiﬁed retirement plan are invested in bonds earning a risk-free gross
(pre-tax) return of Rf and risky stocks with an uncertain gross return of Rt .
The total value (F 401ðkÞtþ1 ) of the 401(k) assets at time t þ 1, usually held in a
401(account), is determined by the previous period’s value minus any
withdrawals (Wt  F 401ðkÞt ), plus additional contributions (At), and returns
from stocks and bonds:
F 401ðkÞtþ1 ¼ ωst

F 401ðkÞt Wt þ At

Rtþ1þ ð1 ωst Þ

F 401ðkÞt Wt þ At

Rf ; for t < K
ð5Þ
We posit that his DC plan assets are held in a Target Date Fund with
stock exposure declining with age following the common rule
ωst ¼ ð100 AgeÞ=100.6 This is a Qualiﬁed Default Investment Alternative
(QDIA) as per Department of Labor regulations (US DOL 2006).
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Wealth dynamics during retirement. The worker can retire and claim social
security beneﬁts between age 62 and 70. After retirement at the endogenous
age K , the individual has the opportunity to save outside the tax-qualiﬁed
retirement plan in stocks and bonds:
Xt ¼ Ct þ St þ Bt ð6Þ
His cash on hand for the next period evolves as follows:
Xtþ1 ¼ StRtþ1 þ BtRf þ Ytþ1ð1 htÞ þWt  Taxtþ1: ð7Þ
Old age retirement beneﬁts provided by Social Security are determined
by the worker’s Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), which depends on his
35 best years of earnings.7 Social Security payments (Ytþ1Þ in retirement
(t  K Þ are given by:
Ytþ1 ¼ PIAK λK εtþ1: ð8Þ
Here, λK is the adjustment factor for claiming before or after the normal
retirement age, which is equal to age 66.8 The variable εt is a transitory shock
εt  LNð0:5σ2ε ; σ2εÞ, which reﬂects out-of-pocket medical and other
expenditure shocks in retirement as in Love (2010). During retirement,
beneﬁts payments from Social Security are partially taxed9 by the individual
federal income tax rate as well as the 1.45 percent Medicare and 4 percent
city and state taxes.
We model the 401(k) plan payouts as follows:
F 401ðkÞtþ1 ¼ ωst

F 401ðkÞt Wt

Rtþ1 þ ð1 ωst Þ

F 401ðkÞt Wt

Rf ; for t < K ð9Þ
Under US law, plan participants must take retirement account payouts from
age 70 onwards, according to the Required Minimum Distribution rules (m)
speciﬁed by the Internal Revenue Service (2012). Accordingly, withdrawals
from the retirement account must take into account the following con-
straints: F 401ðkÞt m  Wt < F 401ðkÞt :
Baseline Results in a ‘Normal’ Interest Rate
Environment
Next we evaluate, in a ‘normal’ interest rate world, how people would
optimally choose their consumption, work effort, the claiming age for social
security beneﬁts, investments in as well as withdrawals from tax-qualiﬁed
401(k) plans, and investments in stocks and bonds. We posit that households
maximize the value function (1) under budget restrictions. This optimization
problem cannot be solved analytically, so it requires a numerical procedure
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using dynamic stochastic programming. To generate optimal policy func-
tions, in each period t we discretize the space in four dimensions 30(X)20
(F 401ðkÞ)8(P)9(K), with X being cash on hand, F 401ðkÞ assets held in the
401(k) retirement plan, P permanent income, and K the claiming age. Next,
we simulate 100,000 independent life cycles based on optimal feedback
controls for each of the six population subgroups of interest (male/female
with <HS, HS, and Coll+). We then aggregate the subgroups to obtain
national mean values using weights from the National Center on Education
Statistics (2012). Speciﬁcally, the weights are 50.7 percent female (and
62 percent with Coll+, 30 percent with HS, and 8 percent with <HS), and
49.3 percent male (and 60 percent with Coll+, 30 percent HS and 10 percent
<HS).
Figure 8.1 reports results for our baseline calibration assuming a risk-free
interest rate of 1 percent, and an expected return on stocks of 5 percent with
a volatility of 18 percent. The life cycle graphs appear in the upper panels,
while social security beneﬁt claiming behavior appears in the lower panels.
Moreover, results for men appear on the left, and for women on the right.
Panels A and B of Figure 8.1 demonstrate that, during working life, labor
income substantially exceeds consumption. This is partly due to the fact that
we show pre-tax income, so after income taxes, net labor income tracks
consumption more closely. During the worker’s ﬁrst decade in the job
market, he saves only a small amount due to the fact that he is liquidity-
constrained when young. (The worker also cannot increase consumption
by borrowing against future labor income). From age 35 onward, savings
rise, especially in the 401(k) plan retirement plan to peak around age 59.
Thereafter, he systematically draws down assets from the plan, since after
age 59.5, he need no longer pay the 10 percent penalty tax for early
withdrawals. In retirement, between age 62 and 70, his social security
income falls below average consumption, with the difference ﬁnanced by
retirement plan withdrawals.
For women, though their labor income is lower than for males, they still
accumulate almost the same amount of retirement plan assets. This can be
explained by the fact that the average life expectancy for women is substan-
tially higher than for men, so women must save more to maintain desired
consumption levels over a longer period. For example, at age 25 (the
starting point of our life cycle model), the life expectancy of females is
age 81, or about 4.5 years more than for males. Both women’s and men’s
consumption drops slightly during the retirement period, which is in line
with both empirical evidence and theoretical life cycle literature (Battistin
et al. 2009; Chai et al. 2011). This can be explained by the sharp increase
in leisure time after people claim social security beneﬁts.10
Panels C and D of Figure 8.1 reveal that the social security claiming
patterns generated by our model align closely with empirical claiming
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rates reported by the US Social Security Administration.11 That is, our
model generates a large peak at the earliest claiming age at 62, whereas in
the data, about 45 percent of workers claim their beneﬁts at this point.
Additionally, and also in line with the evidence, our baseline results show
a smaller second peak at the (system-deﬁned) FRA of 66; here about
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Figure 8.1. Life cycle behavior and social security claiming patterns for males and
females
Note: The top two panels show expected life cycle patterns for males and females (consumption,
income, assets in 401(k) tax-qualiﬁed plans, and bonds/stocks). The lower two panels present
claiming rates generated by our life cycle models versus empirical claiming rates as reported by
the US Social Security Administration for the year 2014. Expected values are calculated from
100,000 simulated lifecycles based on optimal feedback controls. Results for the entire female
(male) population are computed using income proﬁle for three education levels: 62% +Coll;
30% HS; 8% <HS (60% +Coll; 30% HS; 10%<HS). Parameters used for the baseline calibra-
tion are as follows: risk aversion ρ = 5; time preference β = 0.96; leisure preference α = 0.9
(female) α = 1.1 (male); endogenous retirement age 62–70. Social Security beneﬁts are based
on average permanent income and the bend points in place in 2013; minimum required with-
drawals from 401(k) plans are based on life expectancy using the IRS-Uniform Lifetime Table in
2013; tax rules for 401(k) plans are as described in Horneff et al. (2015). The risk premium for
stocks returns is 4% and return volatility 18%; the risk-free rate in the baseline case is 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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15 percent of workers claim beneﬁts for the ﬁrst time. Overall, the results of
our baseline calibration conﬁrm that our model produces realistic results
that agree with observed work, saving, and claiming age behavior of US
households.
Understanding the Impact of Interest Rates
Having provided the baseline ‘normal’ environment results, we next evalu-
ate the changes in a different interest rate environment. To this end we
examine two experiments. First, we reduce the (real) risk-free interest from
1 percent to 0 percent, and second, we increase the real interest rate to
2 percent. (In both cases we keep the equity risk premium at 4 percent).
Table 8.1 reports results for men and women, separately.
In Table 8.1, we report the rates at which people claim their social security
beneﬁts by age, as well as the overall claiming age. One key ﬁnding is that
the lower the risk-free interest rate, the higher the claiming age. In other
words, when the long-term interest rate falls to zero, women claim about
0.4 years later, and men almost a full year later. Another point to note is that
claiming at the earliest possible age of 62 declines quite notably, more so for
men but also for women. We explain this by noting that, when expected
returns are high, the worker can claim early social security beneﬁts without
needing to withdraw as much from his retirement assets, which continue to
earn higher returns for a while longer. But when the real interest rate is low,
a worker can delay claiming social security in exchange for higher lifelong
beneﬁts, and the cost of taking more from his retirement count to support
consumption is lower. This is in line with Shoven and Slavov (2014) who
argued that, by delaying claiming, people can maximize the actuarial net
present value of their lifetime social security beneﬁts in times of low returns.
TABLE . Social security claiming ages for females and males
Claiming rates (%) by age Average Claiming Age
62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
Panel A: Female
0% Interest Rate 46.1 2.1 2.2 3.1 7.2 5.5 9.8 10.7 13.3 65.1
1% Interest Rate 46.6 2.8 2.6 2.3 11.6 7.4 10.0 7.9 8.8 64.8
2% Interest Rate 47.6 2.5 2.4 2.4 13.1 9.9 9.6 5.4 6.9 64.7
Panel B: Male
0% Interest Rate 39.9 3.5 4.7 4.6 16.3 13.1 7.2 5.2 5.5 64.8
1% Interest Rate 42.7 4.9 4.3 4.7 21.6 11.3 3.4 2.4 4.8 64.5
2% Interest Rate 49.6 5.6 4.5 6.2 24.7 4.0 1.5 1.4 2.6 63.9
126 Persistent Low Returns, Saving, and Retirement
By contrast, when returns are higher, the net present value of beneﬁts is
maximized by claiming early. Evidence from Shoven and Slavov (2012) and
Cahill et al. (2015) also suggests that low (high) interest rates result in later
(earlier) claiming ages. Accordingly, our results are in line with empirical
evidence.
Table 8.2 shows how wealth accumulation changes under the two interest
rate regimes, both inside and outside the 401(k) plan. In the low return
environment, workers build up less wealth in their retirement plans. For
instance, when the safe yield is 0 percent, middle aged women (aged 55–64)
optimally accumulate an average of about $88,200 in their 401(k) plans,
while in the 2 percent yield scenario, they average one-third more, or
$117,700, at the same point in their life cycle. Middle-aged men accumulate
$83,200 in the zero-rate environment, and 45 percent more ($120,600) in
the 2 percent interest rate scenario. Interestingly, the opposite pattern
applies to assets held outside the tax-qualiﬁed retirement plans. That is,
women age 45–54 hold $16,600 in liquid stocks and bonds when the interest
rate is zero, but only $9,800 in the 2 percent interest rate scenario. The same
effect also applies to males.
The divergent impact of low versus high interest rates on asset holdings
inside versus outside tax-qualiﬁed retirement plans can be explained as
follows. When the interest rate is low, people work fewer hours per week
TABLE . Life cycle asset accumulation patterns for females and males
Female Male
0%
Interest
Rate
1%
Interest
Rate
2%
Interest
Rate
0%
Interest
Rate
1%
Interest
Rate
2%
Interest
Rate
Panel A: 401(k) assets in $000
Age 25–34 16.8 18.1 21.1 9.9 13.6 14.9
Age 35–44 57.9 70.0 80.2 48.6 65.0 70.3
Age 45–54 92.4 105.0 124.4 91.4 109.2 122.7
Age 55–64 88.2 99.5 117.7 83.2 101.6 120.6
Age 65–74 33.5 48.4 64.4 27.4 43.6 63.1
Age 75–84 10.8 19.5 30.8 8.5 16.0 26.4
Age 85–94 1.6 4.0 7.9 1.2 2.7 5.8
Panel B: Non-qualiﬁed assets in $000
Age 25–34 2.7 3.0 2.6 6.4 4.5 4.3
Age 35–44 11.1 5.8 4.9 18.3 10.8 10.8
Age 45–54 16.6 14.0 9.8 25.6 21.1 18.6
Age 55–64 16.5 19.3 16.0 24.7 22.6 18.3
Age 65–74 25.3 25.9 25.3 28.4 27.2 25.3
Age 75–84 19.7 21.2 21.8 21.1 22.2 23.3
Age 85–94 11.5 13.0 14.1 12.5 13.9 14.3
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early in life, compared to workers in the higher interest environment. For
example, women work two hours per week less between ages 25 and 60 than
they do in the 2 percent interest rate scenario.12 The reason is that, in the
higher return scenario, it is more attractive to build up savings early in life as
these can grow at the higher rate. More work effort then generates higher
labor income, and because of the progressive tax system, this results in larger
allocations to the tax-exempt retirement accounts. In addition, returns
earned on assets held inside the 401(k) plan are tax-free. This second
advantage is, of course, smaller in a zero-return environment. Accordingly,
when interest rates are low (high), workers devote more (less) of their
savings to non-retirement accounts.
Conclusions
Financial writers have noted with concern that the long-term impact of very
low interest rates has been to drive some investors to ‘hunt for yield,’ taking
on riskier investments (Bryan 2016). Yet little academic research has
focused on how persistent low returns would optimally shape workers’ and
retirees’ decision making regarding accumulation and retirement patterns.
Our life cycle model integrates realistic tax, social security, and minimum
distribution rules, as well as uncertain income, stock returns, and mortality.
The baseline calibration generates a large peak at the earliest claiming age
at 62, in line with the evidence. Additionally, baseline results produce a
smaller second peak at the (system-deﬁned) FRA of 66. Overall, the results
of the baseline calibration conﬁrm that our model produces realistic results
that agree with observed work, saving, and claiming age behavior of Ameri-
can households.
The results of alternative interest rate regimes are also quite informative.
One sensible result is that people are predicted to save less during periods of
low returns. Second, people ﬁnance consumption relatively early in retire-
ment by drawing down their 401(k) assets sooner. Third, low rates also
change where people save. During low-return periods, workers save less in
tax-qualiﬁed accounts and more outside tax-qualiﬁed plans, until retire-
ment. The reason is that the tax advantages of saving in 401(k) plans are
relatively less attractive, inasmuch as the gain from saving in pre-tax plans is
lower, and because the return on assets in the retirement account are lower
in a low-return environment. And fourth, we ﬁnd that low interest rates
drive workers to claim social security beneﬁts later, so they can take advan-
tage of the relatively high payoff to deferring retirement under current
rules. In this way, we conﬁrm that tax and social security claiming rules
have a powerful effect on how households are able to adjust to ﬁnancial
market ﬂuctuations.
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Notes
1. We also provide a theoretical backing for the empirical claiming age patterns
identiﬁed by Shoven and Slavov (2012, 2014).
2. Dollar values are given in 2013 terms.
3. Details are given in Horneff et al. (2016).
4. This approach to retirement beneﬁt taxation is therefore similar to how regular
DB and DC plan payments are handled under US tax law. We abstract here from
Roth 401(k)s.
5. For details, see Horneff et al. (2016).
6. This was suggested by Malkiel (1996), for instance.
7. The beneﬁt formula is a piece-wise linear function of the Average Indexed
Monthly Earnings providing (as of 2013) a replacement rate of 90 percent up
to a ﬁrst bend point ($791), 32 percent between the ﬁrst and the second bend
point ($4768), and 15 percent above that. See US SSA (2017).
8. The factors we use are 0.75 (claiming age 62), 0.8 (claiming age 63), 0.867
(claiming age 64), 0.933 (claiming age 65), 1.00 (claiming age 66), 1.08 (claim-
ing age 67), 1.16 (claiming age 68), 1.24 (claiming age 69), and 1.32 (claiming
age 70). See US SSA (2017).
9. For tax rules for social security see US Social Security Administration (2017).
Based on the combined income up to 85 percent of social security can be taxed
for households with high income additional to social security beneﬁts. Yet
because of quite generous exemptions, most households receive their social
security beneﬁts tax-free (see Horneff et al. 2016).
10. This pattern conforms to evidence on expenditure drops after retirement found
by Aguiar and Hurst (2005).
11. For instance, see the US Social Security Administration (2015), Table 6.B5. We
adjust their data to omit disability conversions at age 65 and scale the other age
brackets so they sum to 100 percent.
12. These numbers are not reported in Tables 8.1 and 8.2; computations available
on request.
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